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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to determine why the EU is promoting sustainable development as a 
value in its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), but also to examine what kind of an actor the EU 
is in international relations. Since the 2015 Trade for All strategy, the EU has included 
sustainable development as a key objective in its trade strategy and one way of doing this is 
by adding a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter in its FTAs. This chapter was 
one of the reasons to why the negotiations between the EU and ASEAN failed. However, the 
EU was successful in including the TSD chapter in the bilateral negotiations with Singapore 
and Vietnam, two member countries of ASEAN. The EU is insisting on spreading sustainable 
development, but it does so on a bilateral level instead of a multilateral. Both sustainable 
development and multilateralism is part of the EU’s norms, and there seems to be a clash 
between them.  An ideal type analysis is carried out to research what kind of actor the EU is, 
and the normative power theory and self-interested actor theory is conceptualised in the 
setting of the EU’s promotion of sustainable development in its FTAs with Singapore and 
Vietnam. The results show that the EU might have normative interests in spreading 
sustainable development, but by conducting bilateral agreements, it creates an asymmetric 
form of a dialogue, which makes it a self-interested actor rather than a normative.  
Key words: European Union, trade policy, ASEAN, Vietnam, Singapore, sustainable 
development, multilateralism, normative power, self-interested actor, norm promotion, trade 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 EU and Sustainable Development Promotion in ASEAN  
 
With Trump winning the American elections in 2016, the foreign policy of the country 
changed to an approach of ‘America First’. Many, among those Cecilia Malmström the 
current Trade Commissioner for the European Union (EU), see’s this as a populist agenda that 
serves national interests and is not ideal in the multilateral forum, where the US prefers 
bilateral agreements where it has a comparative advantage. Cecilia Malmström has in many of 
her speeches remarked that the EU stands for something different, and should be seen as 
‘doing good’ in international relations; it stands for values and multilateralism (European 
Commission 2016). One of the values that the EU claims it stands for is sustainable 
development.  
In the 2030 Agenda and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs), it 
states that trade is an engine for economic development, which makes it an essential 
instrument to achieve the dimensions of sustainable development (United Nations 2017). A 
direct response to this was the European Union’s Trade for All strategy, which was adopted in 
2015 (European Commission 2015a).  Through the strategy, sustainability became a crucial 
objective in the EU’s trade policy in its new value-based trade agenda. A part of this approach 
was to include Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters as a standard in its Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs).  
According to the EU, sustainable development includes economic, social and environmental 
dimensions that all should be tackled together. In regards to development, it should meet the 
needs of the present generation without compromising future generations’ ability to meet their 
own needs.  The essence of sustainable development is ‘a life of dignity for all within the 
planet’s limits and reconciling economic efficiency, social inclusion and environmental 
responsibility’ (European Commission 2017a). Other definitions of sustainable development 
exists, however a distinction has been made to use the EU’s definition of it, since it is their 
view on the value that is mainly researched in this paper.  
One of the EU’s policies is to promote region-to-region agreements, in which it through an 
FTA encourages regional integration in the partner region. Woolcock (2007) suggests that the 
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EU prefers regional integration because it is a way to promote the European experience in 
regards to economic and political stability. The EU and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has had contact since 1977, but it was not until 2007 that negotiations of an 
FTA started. However, two years later the talks were paused, and it has been suggested that 
one of the reasons to why these negotiations were paused was because that the EU wanted a 
more comprehensive agreement that, among other things, included a TSD chapter. 
Sustainable development was not seen as ‘Asian values,’ and the TSD chapter was seen as an 
intrusion of the EU into the domestic policies of the sovereign states in ASEAN (Hoang 2017: 
536). 
Shortly after, the EU initiated negotiations with the members of ASEAN bilaterally instead, 
and the only two countries that the EU has concluded negotiations with of those are Singapore 
(in 2014) and Vietnam (in 2016). In the FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, a TSD chapter 
was included, and a question that arises is why the chapter could be included in the bilateral 
FTAs and not in the multilateral FTA. In a bilateral negotiation, the EU being a region clearly 
has a comparative advantage towards the third parties, and could, therefore, use that 
advantage in pushing its own agenda forward. With Trump’s withdrawal of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) it creates new opportunities for the EU in the ASEAN-region. Will these 
opportunities be built upon the promotion of norms (such as sustainable development) or 
rather; a promotion of the EU’s interests, but it wants to be seen as ‘doing good?   Cecilia 
Malmström has criticized Trump for putting America First, but is she and the EU doing the 
same by putting the EU First?  
1.2 Research Aim and Research Questions 
This dissertation aims at getting a deeper understanding of why the EU promotes sustainable 
development as a value in its FTAs. More specifically, this dissertation seeks to study the 
TSD chapter and why it was included in the FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam. This study 
also explores what kind of an actor the EU is in international relations; is it a normative actor 
or a self-interested actor? The EU is insisting on spreading sustainable development as norm 
in its FTAs, but it does so on a bilateral level, and not a multilateral level, which could be 
interpreted as the EU is using its advantage in trade negotiations to countries, where it can 
grant market access in exchange for including a TSD chapter, among other demands. This 
could make the EU a self-interested actor, rather than the normative actor it likes to be 
portrayed as.   
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This is a puzzle because before the conclusion of the FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, the 
ASEAN (in which the two countries are a member of) multilateral agreement failed. One of 
the suggestions to why the negotiations failed was because of the EU’s insistence to include 
the TSD chapter. The EU can be seen as a normative power, not only because it insists on 
spreading norms, such as sustainable development, but also because it is negotiating trade 
agreements on a multilateral level and not primarily on a bilateral level.  
Scholars that study what kind of an actor the EU has not focused on the area of how the EU 
behaves in trade, and especially not in trade negotiations. This is surprising since the EU’s 
trade policies are suitable to analyse because trade negotiations are one of the most important 
parts of the EU as an international actor. The current academic literature has also neglected 
research on the social policies of the EU in trade, however this paper is studying that. Seeing 
how the EU translates its principles into policies, allows for an analyse on what kind of an 
actor it is. When conducting trade agreements, there are negotiations between different policy 
objectives and seeing which of these are attached to the trade agreements can give an 
indication of which norms competed with the EU’s economic interests. The TSD chapter has 
officially been part of the EU’s trade strategy for three years, and yet few scholars have 
studied the implication and use of it in regards to what it says about the EU as an actor, and 
the results are very different. This study is relevant since it researches a new dimension in the 
EU’s norm diffusion, and how it is trying to do pursue it (bilateral vs. multilateral approach), 
which indicates if the EU is a normative or self-interested actor.  
Is the EU a normative actor because it keeps insisting on including TSD chapters in its FTAs, 
and by that spreading sustainable development as a norm and as a standard value in 
international relations, even though it is doing so on a bilateral level? Or, is the EU a self-
interested actor since it is so insistent on spreading sustainable development as a norm that it 
does not take into consideration to the power asymmetry that arises in the bilateral talks and 
because it realises that bilateral negotiations give an advantage in which it can pursue its 
agenda easier? Multilateralism is an important principle for the EU, as well as sustainable 
development and when these two principles clash with each other, to see which one the EU is 
prioritising and why can give an insight in what kind of an actor it is in international relations. 
The overarching research question for this study, based on the research aim is, therefore: 
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- Why does the EU include the value of sustainable development in its Free Trade 
Agreements? 
To help answering the overarching research question, sub-questions have been developed to 
get a clearer picture of what this research aims at answering: 
- How does the EU pursue its norm diffusion of sustainable development in its Free 
Trade Agreements?  
- Why was the TSD chapter included in the bilateral agreements with Singapore and 
Vietnam, but could not be included in the negotiations with ASEAN?  
- What kind of an actor is the EU when it insists on spreading sustainable development 
as a norm, but it does so on a bilateral level and not a multilateral? 
 
1.3 Disposition 
The structure of this paper is the following; in the next chapter, a background of the TSD 
chapter in the EU’s FTAs is accounted for. In chapter 3, a literature review is presented, as 
well as the theoretical base of this thesis, where the two theories; normative actor theory and 
self-interested actor theory is accounted for. The chapter also includes hypotheses that derive 
from the section, as well as an operationalization of the theories, which is used in the results. 
The methodology of the paper is presented in Chapter 4 in which the design, case selection, 
and data processing is discussed. Chapter 5 contains the empirical results, which is divided 
into four sections: one section for each of the research questions of this thesis. Finally, chapter 
6 consists of the conclusions that are drawn from the empirical study, and a concluding 
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2. Background 
2.1 The EU and the TSD chapter 
The EU has always connected non-trade objectives to its trade agreements, and recently this 
main objective has been sustainable development. Since the Uruguay Round, the EU has been 
the most aggressive and persistent advocate of a broader international trade agenda (Peterson 
and Young 2013).   
The principle of sustainable development became an important component of the EU external 
action since Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, which was adopted 
in 2002 (European Commission 2002).  In the 2008 Lisbon Reform Treaty, developmental 
objectives were incorporated in the trade articles guiding trade deals with other partners. It 
implies that the EU has to take into account both the trade liberalization agenda and other 
foreign policy principles such as human rights, fundamental freedoms, and sustainable 
development, in formulating its commercial policy (Hoang 2017). This position was 
reaffirmed in the 2006 Global Europe Strategy which underlined the EU’s commitment 
regarding the promotion abroad of norms in FTAs. ‘In considering new FTAs, we will need to 
work to strengthen sustainable development through our bilateral trade relations. This should 
include incorporating new co-operative provisions in areas relating to labour standards and 
environmental protection’ (European Commission, 2006). Recently, the EU aimed for 
recognition of sustainable development as a general objective (Hoang 2017). In 2015, the 
European Union adopted the Trade for All strategy, in which sustainable development became 
a crucial objective in its new value-based trade agenda (European Commission 2015a).  The 
FTA with Korea was the first agreement to include commitments to sustainable development 
in the preamble and a specific chapter on environment and labour-related issues; this 
agreement is seen as a model for future FTAs between EU and a trading partner (Hoang 
2017). 
The formulation of the TSD chapter in FTAs differs from agreement to agreement, but the 
chapter includes effective implementation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
conventions and Multinational Environmental Agreements (MEA) on environmental 
protection and climate change (European Commission 2017b). Below a description of the 
ILO conventions and MEAs will be accounted for.   
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ILO Core Labour Standards: When complying with this, four principles are being taken 
into consideration: (1) freedom of association and active acknowledgement of the right to 
collective bargaining, (2) elimination of mandatory labour, (3) abolishment of child labour 
and (4) elimination of discrimination in regards of occupation and employment (ILO 1998).   
Multinational Environmental Agreements: The following international conventions are 
agreed upon: - Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal: seeks to reduce hazardous waste generation. - Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants: seeks to protect the 
environmental and human health from persistent organic pollutants.  - Conventions on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora: aims to ensure that more than 35000 animal and plant species are not 
endangered in international trade.  - Convention on Biological Diversity: seeks to guarantee the preservation and 
sustainable use of all ecosystems, species and genetic resources.  - Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: aims to ensure a balance between the use of 
modern biotechnology and economic interest.  - Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: points out the need 
to phase out the consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances. - United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change: aims to stabilise 
greenhouse gas concentrations.  - Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: aims to fight 
global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 
2016&2017b).  
 
As previously mentioned, the content of the TSD chapter varies from agreement to 
agreement, but the TSD chapter contains the following parts, which are usually always 
included in the chapter: 
1. Confirmation of the parties’ commitments to respect and apply multinational 
agreements within protection for workers rights and environment. 
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2. Parties’ rights to regulate national protection levels in regards to workers right and 
environment. 
3. Commitments not to use the sustainable development commitments for protectionist 
use or use low levels of protection as a competitive advantage. 
4. Specific measures within sustainable development that are relevant for the parties. 
5. Measurements to promote trade and investments that contribute to sustainable 
development. 
6. Appliance measurements to ensure the implementation of the commitments in the 
TSD chapter (Zurek 2018).  
Important to note is that in the TSD chapter in FTAs there is no standard dispute settlement 
process for dealing with critique, so it is tough for one party in the agreement to be 
sanctioned. Instead, a panel of experts are responsible for handling the critique, and they 
should report their findings in various ways. Therefore, the content in the TSD chapter can 
be seen as more of a soft law approach, rather than hard law (Campling et al. 2014). Soft law 
refers to a legal instrument that does not have any legally binding force, whereas hard law 
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3. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Norms vs. Interests  
The self-interested actor theory and the normative power actor theory differ in their view on 
the intended motivations the EU has as an international actor. The former theory argues that 
the EU is acting out of its interests strategically, whereas the latter one claims that the EU acts 
accordingly to its norms in an ‘appropriate’ way. If an actor motives are self-interested, the 
behaviour is seen as rational and strategic. With that means that the actor makes necessary 
calculations regarding the effect of its behaviours, and acts according to its benefits, assuming 
that the other actors do the same (March and Olsen 1989: 23). An economic or materialist 
motive mainly drives the interests. This suggests that the EU is acting on spreading 
sustainable development because it believes it is to its advantage.  
In contrast, a normative actor behaves according to norms, which are the most appropriate in 
a given situation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). By acting appropriate, the actor acts 
from norms that are assigned as acting ‘right’ or acting ‘normal’ in international relations. 
The norms are considered to be universally accepted and are not promoted from a 
materialistic or strategic point of view. The values that the EU promotes in its external 
policies come from the values that are being promoted internally within the Union, such as 
democracy and the rule of law and sustainable development. However, it is possible for an 
actor to have ‘normative interests’, as Manners (2002) argue that the EU has.  
One way of distinguishing normative interests from strategic interests is that ‘normative 
interests refer to wider milieu goals instead of more selfish possession goals’ (Forsberg 2013: 
1192). This means that the actor’s interests are concerned with the wider international 
environment, which could lead to possession or materialistic goals. However, the difference 
between the possession goals that a self-interested actor might have and the normative goals a 
normative actor has is that ‘milieu goals are persuaded consistently over time, and not only at 
the time when they also represent immediate possession goals’ (Tocci 2008: 4). In the case of 
the EU’s sustainable development promotion, it could be considered to be normative if the 
EU aims on doing this to avoid a race-to-the-bottom and to benefit the international 
community as a whole. However, if the EU is doing this in the end to ultimately benefit itself 
for example protectionist reasons, it should be regarded as a strategic interest.  
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3.2 The EU as a Global Trade Actor 
The academic debate regarding what kind of an actor the EU is extensive, but few scholars 
have considered the trade area when describing the EU as an actor. Instead, areas such as 
security, development, and human rights promotion have been the focus in the literature. As 
previously mentioned, the EU as a trade actor is suitable to analyse because trade is one the 
most important parts of the EU being a global actor and it is an excellent example in seeing 
what objectives are attached to trade agreements. This could indicate which norms are 
competing with the EU’s economic interests, and the form of the agreement can also indicate 
if the EU prioritised commercial interests or multilateralism.  
The EU states that it wants to include sustainable development in its FTAs to ‘shape 
globalisation’ and avoid a race-to-the-bottom when it comes to social policies (European 
Commission, 2015). However, some trading partners to the EU fear that the EU is using the 
TSD chapter as a hidden cloak for protectionist uses (Sicurelli 2015). The question that arises 
is then if the EU is includes the TSD chapter to promote its norms or interests? If the EU does 
it to promote norms, it fits more with the normative power theory, whereas if it does it to 
promote economic interests, it fits more with the self-interested actor theory. It is also 
possible that the EU promotes both, in which there is no clear answer to which actor theory 
the EU corresponds to the most.  
Before Manners (2002) introduced the concept of a Normative Power Europe (NPE), the 
debate regarding the EU as a power mostly discussed the EU as a civilian power or military 
power. A military power uses military means and uses coercion to influence other actors in 
the international arena. A civilian power, on the other hand, uses non-military means, such as 
cultural, diplomatic and economic policy instrument, and uses cooperation to influence other 
actors (Smith 2005). The means of influence of a civilian power can also be described as 
‘soft’ power. Nye (2004: 256), who introduced the concept, describes it at as  ‘the ability to 
get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’. In trade negotiations, 
the EU is using civilian, or soft power, instead of military power.  
The size of the internal market of the European Union and since it has over 40-years 
experience of negotiating trade agreements has made the EU’s trading block the most 
powerful in the world (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006: 907). When negotiating FTAs, it is the 
European Commission (EC), represented by the Trade Commissioner and the Directorate 
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General Trade (DG Trade) that has the mandate to initiate trade agreements. If the agreement 
is integrating many areas, the Commissioners of those areas might be represented as well in 
the negotiations to assist the Trade Commissioner. It is the Council of Ministers (who 
represents the Member States) role to decide the mandate for the Commission during 
negotiations, and they also have the last saying regarding the ratification of the agreement 
(Dür and Zimmerman 2007: 773). The European Parliament (EP), in which the Member 
States are also represented, does not have much formal influence on the EU trade policy 
decisions.  They have the largest influence in bilateral and interregional negotiation when the 
agreements concern issues on which the Parliament has formal powers on (Zimmerman and 
Dür 2007: 774).  
Scholars have questioned if the EU manages to speak with one single voice in negotiations 
since it represents 28 Member States. Not being perceived as a unitary actor could affect the 
effectiveness of the EU in trade negotiations. Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006: 907) introduced 
a new concept to describe the EU as; a Conflicted Trade Power, and one of the reasons to why 
it is conflicted is because it is influenced a lot by the different governments of its Member 
States. Traditionally, it has been viewed in the European Parliament (EP) that there is a 
North-South divide between the Members States, where the north is seen to pursue more trade 
liberalization policies, whereas the South is assumed to favour more protectionist policies. 
However, this divide is not always accurate, and Dür and Zimmerman (2007) argue that this 
should not affect the EU being perceived as a unitary actor. This is because the national 
parliaments and the EP have limited power and influence in international trade negotiations. 
The availability for the EU to act as a negotiator in trade negotiations is therefore assumed to 
be good, as long as the EC does not violate the essential interests of the Members States and 
manage to have them on its side.  
The EU has also been described as an economic power, and the difference between a civilian 
power and economic power is that the size of the economy of an actor is of much more 
importance in the latter one. In the case of the EU, the size of its global economy matters in 
its power relations. The EU can externalise several of its internal policies, through its large 
single market (Vogel 1995). The size of the market is of importance for an economic power, 
and all other actors feel the economic power, but it might not have as much of an effect on the 
other large economic powers in the international system (Damro 2012: 686). The EU can use 
its market size through economic coercion/persuasion, since it can threat with a complete or 
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partial closure of its market, in order to force or persuade other actors to change their 
behaviour (Drezner 2007: 32).  
 
This is similar thoughts as Damro (2012: 697), who launched another concept; ‘Market Power 
Europe’. He argues that the EU is fundamentally an internal market and is, therefore, more 
likely to influence the behaviour of third parties through its market-polices than its core 
norms. However, Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006: 910) mean that the EU is using its trade 
power to accomplish non-trade objectives (such as sustainability). A trade power uses ‘carrot 
and sticks’ to diffuse norms, rather than through cooperation and consensus, as the civilian 
power theory suggests (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006: 920).  
3.3 Normative Power Theory 
The normative power theory was presented by Ian Manners (2002) as an alternative to the 
academic debate, which categorized the EU as either a civilian or military power. Carr (1962), 
Duchêne (1973), Galtung (1973) and Rosecrance (1998) previously introduced the idea of a 
Normative Power Europe in the literature. Carr (1962: 108) made the distinction between 
economic power, military power and power over opinion. Duchêne (1973: 2) described the 
European Community as an idée force, whereas Galtung (1973: 33) talked about ‘ideological 
power is the power of ideas’ and that it is powerful because the sender of the ideas affects and 
shape the will of the recipient of ideas through culture. Rosecrance (1998: 22) proposes that 
‘Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical’. However, it was through Manners 
that the idea was developed, conceptualized and theorized, which the current academic 
literature mainly builds upon.  
By introducing NPE, Manners (2002) argues that the need to analyse the EU as a normative 
power is motivated by how the traditional views (seeing the EU as a civilian/military power) 
is not taking the EU’s unique structures and processes into consideration and that one of their 
main problems ‘is their unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looks’ 
(Manners 2002: 239).  The EU is therefore neither a civilian nor a military power; instead, it 
is a normative power that can use civilian or military instruments to shape conceptions of 
‘normal’ in international relations.  
The combination of the EU’s historical context, hybrid polity, and the legal constitution is 
part of the EU’s uniqueness, which places universal norms and principles at the centre of its 
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relationship with its Member States and the rest of the world.  In other words, the EU is 
constructed on a normative basis, which predisposes it  ‘to act in a normative way in world 
politics’ (Manners 2002: 252). The foreign policy of the EU is therefore understood as a 
product of its basic norms and values, which constructed the Union in the first place and is 
still the core of its existence. This is something that has been constantly overlooked according 
to Manners, ‘the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it 
does or what it says, but what it is’ (IBID).  
The basic norms of the European Union have according to Manners (2002: 242) been 
developed through conditions, criteria, declarations, policies, and treaties the past 50 years (at 
the time of Manners writing the article).   Through these, it is possible to identify five ‘core’ 
norms and four ‘minor’ norms within the constitution and practices of the EU. These values 
are seen as universal. The five core norms are peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights. The four minor norms include social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development and good governance.  
To understand how the EU makes its policy-making process, Manners (2008) provided a 
tripartite analytical framework. This involves three different steps: 
1) Examining the core principles of the EU and how these principles become promoted 
as aims and objectives in world politics. 
2) Looking at how the EU promotes its core principles as actions and policies in world 
politics. 
3) Considering the impact and outcomes of the activities the EU takes in promoting its 
core principles in world politics.  
 
Manners (2002: 244-245) suggest six factors, which explains the diffusion of norms and 
where the EU’s normative power stems from. These six factors are contagion, informal 
diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter. Contagion is 
the unintentional diffusion of norms/ideas from the EU to other political actors; an example of 
this is when the EU acts as a good example. Informal diffusion occurs as a result of strategic 
communications by the EU, for example, new policy initiatives from the EU. Procedural 
diffusion takes place in the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third 
party; this could be done through an interregional cooperation agreement. Transference 
   
   17 
happens when the EU exchanges aid, foods, technical assistance or trade with third parties 
through mostly substantive or financial means, e.g., exporting community norms and 
standards. Overt diffusions are the result of the physical presence of the EU in third-party 
states and international organizations; this could be for example the role of embassies of 
Member States. Cultural filter regards the impact of international norms in third-party 
countries and international organizations, which leads to the learning, adaptation or rejection 
of norms; an example is the human rights diffusion in Turkey.  Regarding the cultural filter, 
Chaban et al. (2015) mean that a lot of more emphasis should be put on that mechanism 
because understanding the EU’s norm diffusion needs to take the receivers’ of the norms 
cultural filters into consideration as well.  For norms to be adopted by a third party, it needs 
first to be recognized and then viewed as successful. Just because a norm is exported, does 
not necessarily mean it gets imported (Björkdahl and Elgström 2015).  
To summarise, the main argument of the normative power theory is that the unique structure 
and constitution of the EU make it predisposed to act in a normative way and the diffusion of 
its norms is central in its international relations. These norms are universal and by EU 
spreading these norms, it tries to shape the conceptions of what is normal in the international 
environment.  
3.4 Self-Interested Actor Theory 
A self-interested actor behaves according to interests in a logical way where the consequences 
of the actions are taken into consideration. The EU is therefore assumed to make calculative 
decisions and acts according to its benefits (March and Olsen 1989). The alternative 
viewpoint in international relations of seeing the EU as a normative power or a ‘force for 
good’ is seeing it as a ‘collective hegemon’ (Bendiek and Kramer 2010: 470). A collective 
hegemon is guided by its interests and in the case of the EU; its exports of values are seen as 
an expression of its hegemonial identity. The foreign policy of the Union is seen as a strategy 
to pursue ‘milieu shaping’, where the goal is to establish a stable and cooperative 
environment, in which the EU can follow its economic and political interests in an optimal 
way. As mentioned in section 4.1 an actor can have normative interests, which refers to 
broader milieu goals, but the difference from that and having the strategic interests is that a 
self-interested or strategic actor have wider milieu goals to shape the environment, so its 
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interests can easily be followed. That is not the objective for an actor with normative interests, 
who wants to shape the international environment but not for possessing goals.  
Hyde-Price (2006) also sees the EU as a collective hegemon that tries to shape its external 
surroundings to a form that is of advantage for its interests. The EU is doing so by using a 
combination of soft power and hard power. However, the EU can be seen as more of 
‘benevolent hegemon’ than a ‘coercive hegemon’ since the emphasis of its politics is towards 
compromise. According to Hyde-Price (2008: 32), the EU acts for a collective pursuit of the 
common or shared interests between the Member States. These ‘European’ interests are 
different from the interests that Manners suggests that the EU strives for, and Hyde-Price 
argue that they include: ‘the territorial integrity, political and strategic security, and prosperity 
and economic well-being for its member states’. It is these interests that have led the EU to be 
a global economic actor.  
For Hyde-Price, the problem with this is that the EU is ultimately pursuing its interests, but 
claim to be ‘doing good’; what is good for Europe, is not automatically good for the world. 
Therefore these values cannot be seen as universal. Tocci (2008: 5) raises the point that if a 
normative foreign policy is associated with being ‘good’, caution should be made with what 
values we put in a ‘good’ foreign policy, since it sometimes can be imperialistic values, and 
then the values can’t be seen as objective or universalistic. However, just because a strategic 
actor is more calculating and acts in a way that benefits it the most, does not mean that it 
automatically dismisses notions of human rights, international law, and injustice (Hyde-Price 
2008: 37). However, even though these values might be ‘European’, Aggestam (2008: 7) 
argues that caution should be made when talking about and projecting European values in 
foreign policy, since it insinuates a view that others are in need of a change: ‘it communicates 
a message of Europe as morally superior and an image of others as ruled by the “law of the 
jungle”’.  
A self-interested actor could also act in a soft imperialist way, just as Hettne and Söderbaum 
(2005) suggest. The authors argue that it is possible for a soft imperialist actor to impose 
norms and have norms, but the difference from a normative actor is that these are used in a 
strategic way, or for self-interested reasons. In an interregional context, Hettne and 
Söderbaum (2005: 551-552) suggest that even though most of the EU’s interregional relations 
are conducted officially under civilian norms and a liberal agenda, the actual implementation 
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of this agenda depends on the relative power positions of the EU and its counterparts. With 
weaker partners, the EU controls much more of the conditions for the cooperation, which 
could lead to more imperial relations. This could help explain the difference in the EU’s 
relations between the relatively strong East Asian region as opposed to the relatively weak 
South Asia region (because the EU also differentiates within regions).   
To summarise, the central argument of the self-interested actor theory is that the EU is a 
collective hegemon in the sense that it spreads its norms to shape the international 
environment in a way that benefits its interests. These norms are not universal since they 
represent what is good for the EU and not automatically what is good for the rest of the world.   
The current literature regarding the EU as a trade power, argues that it uses its market size in 
trade negotiations to pursue its interests, this corresponds to the self-interested actor theory. 
The scholars who ascribe the EU as a normative power, has primarily not looked at the EU in 
trade negotiations. It is, therefore, a gap in the current literature on what kind of an actor the 
EU is in trade negotiations. This study aims to shed light on this gap, by doing an ideal type 
analysis between the normative power theory and the self-interested actor theory, to see which 
one the EU corresponds to.  
3.5 Hypotheses and Operationalization 
Both the normative power theory and the self-interested actor theory argue that the EU is an 
actor that best can be described to their theories. Therefore, the two hypotheses that emerge 
from the previous section is: 
H1: The EU is a normative power actor because it seeks to diffuse norms in the international 
system that is universal and it behaves accordingly to appropriateness.   
H2: The EU is a self-interested actor because it is exporting values and shaping the 
international system, ultimately to benefit its interests.   
To test the hypotheses on the empirical data, two ideal types are created. For the ideal types to 
be operationalized they need to contain elements, which is comparable to reality; the ideal 
type cannot miss relevance for the reality where it shall be applied (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 
139). When doing a polarised ideal type analysis, the categories within the ideal types need to 
be parallel: a characteristic within one of the polarized ideal type needs to correspond to a 
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feature by the other polarized ideal type (IBID).  When creating an ideal type it is essential to 
bring forward the main characters of the theory. The variables from the theory will, later on, 
be compared to the empirical material. By doing so, it is possible to see if the unit of analysis 
has similar values as the ideal types suggest it should have. In this case, analysing how the EU 
is promoting sustainable development in its negotiation of FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, 
makes it possible to see which characteristics of the ideal types the EU possess, and which 
ideal type it corresponds to the most. Two ideal types are created Normative Power Actor and 
Self-Interested Actor. 
The variables that will be compared in the ideal type analysis are Interests, Behaviour, Means 
of Power and Desired Outcome. These categories are created to compare the two ideal types 
to each other. The categories are parallel to each other and are chosen because they capture 
the essence of the two theories. These categories are built upon previous research, and mostly 
upon an ideal type analysis that Forsberg (2011) did. However, Forsberg only created this 
ideal type for the normative power. Therefore caution has been made so it will be able to fit to 
create an ideal type for the self-interested actor theory as well. These categories will be the 
base for doing the actor analysis in the results part, and by applying the case of the EU’s 
promotion of sustainable development as a value, they will be sufficient to determine what 
kind of an actor the EU is. According to Forsberg, it is not clear how many of these categories 
need to be fulfilled in order for an actor to be classified as the ideal type. However, it is clear 
that none of these categories can stand-alone. Therefore, if the actor fulfils more than one of 
these categories, it should fit into that ideal type. 
Important to note though, it is not possible for an actor to fit into both of these ideal types. 
This is because the two theories represent two extreme points on what kind of an actor the EU 
is; they are the opposite of each other. If an actor is self-interested, it is by definition not a 
normative actor and the similarly, if an actor is normative, it cannot be self-interested. 
However, elements of both of the theories could fit into what kind of an actor the EU is, but it 
should not be more than one category that the two theories are similar on. This is because if 
the EU would fit into more than two categories of both of the theories, it is not clear which 
ideal type that the EU symbolises. If the EU would correspond to interests for example on 
both theories, that is not a problem, but the two theories should not be similar on more than 
one of the categories. If that would be the case, then the categories would need to be revised. 
To ensure this will not happen, the thought of categories are tested on the empirics before the 
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analysis is created. This also concerns the validity of the thesis, which is further explained in 
section 4.1.  
This thesis is testing what kind of an actor the EU is in the case of their sustainable 
development promotion in the FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, it is possible that the 
outcome of what kind of an actor the EU is would be different if another setting or policy area 
is researched. This result is not necessarily applicable to all cases in all times. However, a 
discussion of this will follow in the conclusion where the generalizability of the study will be 
discussed.  
Table 1. Operationalization of variables 
 Normative Power Actor Self-Interested Actor 
Interests Normative Interests Strategic Interests 
Behaviour Behaves According to Norms Behaves According to Self-
Interests 
Means of Power Mostly Normative Power Civilian/Economic Power 
Desired Outcome Achieve Normative Ends Achieve Self-Interested Ends 
 
3.5.1 Ideal Type: Normative Power Actor 
As previously mentioned, the criteria for the EU as a normative power that will be used in an 
ideal type analysis is the following:  
1. Normative Interests 
2. Behaves According to Norms 
3. Uses Normative Means of Power 
4. Achieve Normative Ends 
 
The first criterion is that a normative power has normative interests. It is generally assumed 
that a normative power has different interests from a traditional power, which is expected to 
have strategic- or self-interests (Forsberg 2011: 1192). Manners (2009) argue that the EU has 
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normative interests when including the social dimension in its trade policies. As previously 
mentioned, normative interests refer to wider ‘milieu goals’ rather than self-interested goals, 
and the EU wants to shape the international environment for the ‘common good’ and not 
because it would ultimately benefit itself. 
A normative power behaves in a normative way is the second criterion. This could be defined 
as the actor follows norms such as international law or multilateralism.  With this argument, a 
normative power could use military power, if it does so multilaterally and with respect for 
international law (Forsberg 2011: 1193), in the end, it is about acting ‘appropriate’. A 
normative power, therefore, behaves according to international norms. 
The third criterion regards that a normative power refers to the means of influence. This 
suggests that the EU uses normative power rather than military or economic power. However, 
it is not suggested that the EU would exclusively rely on normative power since it has a lot of 
economic power, which is often used (Forsberg 2011: 1194). The EU has a cooperative 
approach through persuasion when using its power rather than using its power in a coercive 
way, and it acts according to the general rules and practices.  
Finally, the fourth and last criterion is that a normative power achieves normative ends. It is 
about the EU is successful in diffusing its norms in the international system. Being successful 
in this case is about making the receiver of the norms internalize them, but also about shaping 
what is ‘normal’ in international environment.   
3.5.2 Ideal Type: Self-Interested Actor 
Even though no scholar has summed up the criteria for being a self-interested actor in the 
same way that has been done for a normative power actor, the same categories will be used to 
define the self-interested criteria in the ideal type analysis. These categories are: 
1. Strategic Interests 
2. Behaves According to Self Interests 
3. Uses Different Means of Power 
4. Achieve Self-Interested Ends 
 
Having strategic interests is at the core of being a self-interested actor, and it is assumed that 
the interests that the actor have are interests that benefit itself, rather than benefiting ‘the 
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common good’. Hyde-Price (2006: 217) argues that the EU is ultimately expressing the views 
of its Member States, and the opinions of those are often strategic and self-interested. Smith 
(2003) agrees to this notion and claims that the EU Member States attitude to promote norms 
and values internationally are based on calculations regarding the benefits of the political 
scale, and they take economic interests and national security into consideration.  
When a normative power behaves in a normative way, it is suggested that the actor follows 
norms such as international law or multilateralism. A strategic actor does not necessarily need 
to do this since it is calculating what benefits itself the most, however, it can do this, and 
some strategic actors are doing this.  
Regarding the third criterion and the means of power, a self-interested actor can use both soft 
and hard power tools, which is something the EU does according to Hyde-Price (2008: 31-
32). Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 539) suggest that the EU is using soft power in a hard way 
(soft imperialism) and depending on how powerful, its counterpart is, the EU is either using 
civilian power or soft imperialism. The normative power ideal type does not exclude the fact 
that the EU cannot use other power than normative power, but the difference between these 
two ideal types is that a normative power relies mostly on normative power, whereas a 
strategic actor does not have a predisposed way to act.  
The final criterion suggests that a self-interest actor achieves a self-interested end. Laïdi 
(2008) argues that to advance its strategic interests; the EU aims at getting the support of the 
international system. This notion is something that Bendiek and Kramier (2010: 469) agree 
with since they argue that the EU can be seen as a collective hegemon in which the goal is to 
establish a stable and cooperative environment within the international system, so the EU’s 
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4. Methods and Data  
4.1 Approach and Design  
This thesis takes it position in the fact that the EU is described as a normative power, but not 
many scholars have examined if the EU acts like one when it comes to trade negotiations. I 
argue, that looking at how the EU translates its normative objectives into external policies in 
its trade negotiations, will add on to the existing literature in trying to describe what kind of 
an actor the EU is.  The thesis, therefore, has a descriptive approach, in explaining what kind 
of actor the EU is when making a comparison between the normative power theory and self-
interested actor theory. However, the thesis also explores how and why the EU includes the 
value of sustainable development in its FTAs It also researches the reasons for why the 
negotiations with ASEAN were paused and why the TSD chapter was included in the bilateral 
agreements with Singapore and Vietnam, but could not be included in the FTA negotiations 
with ASEAN. The most appropriate design for a descriptive and exploratory thesis is a 
qualitative approach. Qualitative description is suitable for answering questions of the 
character of who, what and where, and it is also useful when the aim is to get a straight 
description of a phenomenon. An ideal type analysis is conducted to determine what kind of 
actor the EU is, a case study is done to compare the differences and similarities between 
Singapore and Vietnam. Qualitative text analysis and content analysis is the base for the 
explorative part of the thesis (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011).  
By doing an ideal type analysis the goal is to understand which ideal type a phenomenon is 
part or not part of (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 140). In this case, the EU as a normative power and 
the EU as a self-interested actor are the ideal types, which will be analysed by examining the 
EU’s sustainable development promotion in the negotiation of trade agreements with 
Singapore and Vietnam. The question asked when conducting an ideal type analysis is to what 
extent the phenomena resemble the ideal type (IBID).  Since ideal types are not an accurate 
form of reality, the empirics cannot throw it away.  
The most critical argument against an ideal type is not that it lacks empirical evidence, instead 
of, that it is unfruitful for empirical analysis (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 143). This puts a lot of 
demand on the analytical tool that is created for the ideal types. By comparing the real-life 
phenomena with a pure ideal type, characteristic features of the real-life aspects are captured. 
The most practical is to compare two polar ideal types, which is done in this case; the EU as a 
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normative power actor and the EU as a self-interested actor. In this kind of analysis, the two 
ideal types are thought of as extreme points on a line. The question that is, therefore, being 
asked is where on this line, the real-life phenomenon is placed (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 141). If 
the ideal type does not measure what it says it should measure, validation problems can occur 
(Bergström and Boréus 2014: 167).   
In order to overcome validation problems, it is essential to test the ideal types in the empirical 
analysis and see if the classification that was made in the ideal types are working to capture 
the phenomenon that is being researched, but also making sure that the categories are relevant 
to real life (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 141). Since the ideal types are based on previous 
research/theories and have been tested on the empirical material, to ensure that the essence of 
the theories is being captured, the validity should be good. Reliability concerns if someone 
else can repeat the study and get similar results to ensure good reliability, accidental or 
careless mistakes should be avoided (Esaiasson 2012: 62). 
Since this study is looking at contemporary events and wants to understand why the TSD 
chapter was included in the FTA with Singapore and Vietnam, a case study is made. Since the 
study is regarding a set time of period (the years of negotiation and concluding of the 
agreements), and since the paper is looking at the policy area of the TSD chapter and not the 
whole FTA, it fulfils the criteria of having clear boundaries in regards to geographical, 
temporal and topical policies to be studied (Yin 2009: 32).  Studying the TSD chapter fits the 
motivation for a representative or typical case study, since the TSD chapter in FTA is one 
example of EU trade policy among several others and could be seen as an example on how 
the EU’s trade policy is formulated and why the EU promotes the value of sustainable 
development (Yin 2009: 47-49).   
A general critique to use case studies as a method is that it is often unable to make 
generalizations of a limited number of cases  (Geddes 2003). However, it is possible to make 
a statement, draw a conclusion or end up with findings that are relevant beyond the cases, if 
they apply to the life of the case beyond the research situation (Flick 2007). It is about the 
possibility to generalize outside of the particular study. By comparing the FTA negotiations 
and the TSD chapter in Vietnam and Singapore, these two cases could help to see patterns in 
the EU’s foreign trade policy. Is the EU now starting to do more of bilateral negotiations 
because it is easier for it to get its will through (such as including TSD chapters)? This could 
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say something about what kind of actor the EU is in foreign trade, but also what kind of actor 
the EU is in international relations in general. Is the EU a normative power or a self-interested 
actor?   
4.2 Data and Case Selection 
The empirical material in this study is based on literature and documents. The data collection 
for this thesis is mainly based on secondary sources in forms of academic articles, which in 
turn have done empirical research. An example of this is Hoang’s paper from 2016, which 
describes the perceptions of the Vietnamese on the EU as a norm promoter, where he 
interviewed people from the government ministries in Vietnam. A disadvantage in my 
research has been the difficulty in finding official statements from Vietnam or Singapore in 
English to understand how they perceived the EU in the negotiations. However, English 
articles made by scholars understanding the language have made those views possible to 
understand, and therefore has been used in this paper. When it comes to understanding the 
EU’s view, official documents have been used.  
It should be noted that when analysing why the EU includes the value of sustainable values, 
speeches from Cecilia Malmström is used, however, she was not the Trade Commissioner 
during the time of the negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam. It is therefore not certain that 
the reasons for including the TSD chapter are the same now, as it was during the negotiations. 
However, speeches or statements from the previous Trade Commissioners are insufficient for 
explaining the motives for the EU. However, even though Cecilia Malmström launched the 
Trade for All strategy, the ideas behind it have been in the Union for a longer period than 
2015. Therefore, the speeches of Malmström have been used and they are assumed to 
represent the views of the Union during the negotiations with ASEAN, Vietnam, and 
Singapore.  
Another important thing to take into consideration with the data that I have used is that it is 
based on the material that is available. All of the documents regarding trade negotiations are 
not official and it is hard to know what exactly has been said during different internal or 
external meetings without attending them. The secrecy of these negotiations is therefore 
limiting in this study since it is only possible to judge and value the EU’s actions based on the 
material that is available. 
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When choosing the cases for this study, it was based on a strategic case selection. The reason 
for selecting Singapore and Vietnam is that they are the only two countries that have 
concluded FTAs with the EU in ASEAN, although they have not been ratified yet, they have 
been concluded. Since it is the content of the FTAs that are important in this study, it is 
essential to know the scope of the FTAs when making a comparison. The study is interested 
in investigating why the TSD chapter could be included in bilateral agreements with countries 
in ASEAN, but not in the ASEAN region agreement, and therefore it is important to compare 
this with countries that have the TSD chapter included in the FTA.  
After the regional negotiations with ASEAN paused in 2009, the EU’s Member States agreed 
that the European Commission should pursue bilateral FTA instead. In 2010, the EU launched 
negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia. However, after seven rounds of talks with 
Malaysia, the negotiations were paused in April 2012, by Malaysia’s request. In June 2012, 
the EU launched negotiations with Vietnam and with Thailand in March 2013. Four rounds of 
talks took place with Thailand, but since the takeover by the military in Thailand in May 
2014, no further negotiation talks have been scheduled. In 2016, the EU launched 
negotiations with Philippines and Indonesia, two rounds of talks have taken place with the 
Philippines (the last one in February 2017), but no date has been scheduled for the next round 
of negotiations. Indonesia has also had two rounds of talks with the EU (the last one very 
recently, in February 2018) and the next round of the negotiations talks is yet to be confirmed. 
When it comes to Myanmar, the EU has not launched FTA negotiations with the country; 
instead it started negotiations for an investment protection agreement, four rounds of talks 
have taken place, and one technical discussion (in April 2017) but no date has been scheduled 
for the next round of negotiations (European Commission 2018a).  
As previously mentioned, the EU launched negotiations with Singapore in 2010 and with 
Vietnam in 2012. Most of the negotiations with Singapore, such as the scope of the 
agreement, were concluded in October 2014, but before it enters into force, it needs to be 
formally accepted by the European Commission, agreed upon by the Council of Ministers and 
then ratified by the European Parliament. The preliminary text of the FTA with Vietnam was 
completed in February 2016, now the legal review is almost finished and when that is done 
the FTA will be translated into all official languages of the EU and Vietnamese before it is 
presented to the Council and Parliament. It is expected that the FTAs enter into force by the 
end of 2018 (IBID).  
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The chosen method within the comparative case study is Most Different Systems Design 
(MDSD). Using MSDS means that cases are chosen because they are similar to the variable 
of interest but are different on the other variables (Otner 2012: 2). In this study, the variable 
of interest is the inclusion of the TSD chapter in the FTA with the EU. The variables in which 
the countries differ and is accounted for is Population, GDP (PPP), Export to the EU, Import 
from the EU, Total trade with the EU, Number of FTA’s in place and Status of Economy. All 
relevant control variables are not accounted for or checked since it could be an endless 
number of variables in that case (Otner 2012), but these are variables that could have an 
impact between the countries negotiations with the EU. It is assumed here that a stronger and 
more developed economy is more equal towards the EU during negotiations (even though the 
EU is a region and more significant than any of the economies of Singapore and Vietnam) 
and therefore can set against easier if the EU proposes a self-interested agenda. If the country 
also has more experience in negotiation with FTAs that is assumed here to be an asset as well. 
Table 2. Case country background  
 Singapore Vietnam 
Population (2017) 5.88 million  96.16 million 
GDP (PPP) (2017) $ 513.7 billion  $	643.8	billion	 
Export to the EU  (2016) €	19.466	million € 33.087 million 
Import from the EU (2016) € 31.475 million € 9.486 million 
Total trade with EU € 50.941 million  € 42.574 million 
Number of FTAs in place 21  14 
Status of economy Highly Developed Economy Developing Economy 
Sources: CIA World Factbook (2018a-b); European Commission (a-b); Enterprise Singapore 
(2018); Heritage (a-b); WTO Center (2018).  
4.3 Processing the Data 
Two methods are used for processing the data for this study: qualitative text analysis and 
directed content analysis. By doing a qualitative text analysis, the essential parts of a text are 
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brought forward by carefully reading all the elements of the texts, as well as understanding 
the context within. Qualitative text analysis is preferred over quantitative content analysis 
because it is the wholeness of the text that is central, and not the details of it (Esaiasson 2012: 
210). When reading, there are specific questions to ask the text. In this study the questions 
that are asked are: - What is the point of the text? - Is the position supported by what the text says? 
 
This study is doing a systematic qualitative text analysis since the main point is to clarify the 
thoughts and arguments by the actors that are important in the debate regarding the studied 
phenomenon. The first step is to define what should be researched in the texts. The text 
analysis is partly applied to the ideal type analysis, and the themes that are being studied are 
mainly the normative actor theory and self-interested actor theory. The text analysis is used 
for processing the data in the empirical material when discussing what kind of an actor the 
EU is. The text analysis is also used for answering the questions regarding how the EU 
pursues its value of sustainable development in its FTAs, and the EU’s negotiation with 
ASEAN and Singapore/Vietnam. The themes that are being studied then are the EU and 
sustainable development, the EU as an actor, the EU’s negotiation with ASEAN, and the FTA 
between the EU and Singapore/Vietnam. The actors in the analysis are the EU, ASEAN, 
Singapore, and Vietnam. Since the actors are important in this study, it is essential to keep 
track of who says what.  
The directed content analysis is applied when analysing speeches from the EU’s current Trade 
Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström. Since the thesis is following a deductive approach, in 
which existing theories is tested, directed content analysis is applied. The content of the 
speeches and statements are used to guide and code the findings in the data (Hsieh & Shannon 
2005). For this study, Malmström’s speeches are used to understand why the EU includes 
sustainable development as a value in its FTAs. The content analysis is executed by looking 
for speeches, which talks about the EU and sustainable development promotion.  A directed 
content analysis aims at ‘validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory’ 
(Hsieh & Shannon 2005: 1281), which is in line with this thesis, since this could bring clarity 
in understanding the interests of the EU, which ultimately has an impact in deciding what 
kind of an actor the EU is.  
   
   30 
4.4 Source Criticism  
Since the empirical material is based on literature and documents, it is crucial to be critical to 
the sources. When going through the sources, it is important to be aware of the authenticity, 
relevance, and impartiality (Esiasasson 2012: 279). The empirical material for this study is 
mostly based on official documents, which could be regarded as primary sources, and 
scientific articles, which could be regarded as secondary sources. The official sources are 
widely used and updated frequently. They are also reviewed regularly, which increases the 
authenticity and relevance of the material. The official documents usually represent the views 
of the organisations; therefore they cannot be described as impartial, but they are used in a 
way to understand the EU’s views on different things. Consequently it is assumed that they 
are partial, but it should not be a problem. Some articles from think tanks, and organisations 
are used in this paper, but they have been weighted against each other, to present an accurate 
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5. Analysis and Results 
5.1 Why the EU Includes Sustainable Development as a Norm in FTAs? 
In 2015, the EU presented its new trade strategy Trade for All, where sustainable 
development became a crucial objective in the new value-based trade agenda (European 
Commission, 2015). Cecilia Malmström, the current trade commissioner for the EU, was the 
person who introduced and implemented this strategy. Therefore, an analysis of her 
statements and speeches will be used foremost to understand why the EU includes sustainable 
development as a norm in its FTAs, combined with qualitative text analysis. It should be 
noted that the EU included the TSD chapter in the South Korea FTA in 2011. However, it was 
considered to be a norm after being included in the trade strategy. The EU’s promotion of the 
MEAs corresponds to its norm of sustainable development, but the promotion of the ILO’s 
Core Labour Standards compares not only to the norm of sustainable development but also to 
the EU’s norms of social solidarity, non discrimination and even more importantly, the core 
norm of human rights (Orbie 2011: 163).  
The EU states in the strategy that it use trade policy in order promote sustainable development 
and ‘this is done in a positive, incentive-based way, without any hidden protectionist agenda’ 
(European Commission 2015a: 23). However, the fear of some countries that negotiate FTAs 
with the EU is that the TSD chapter is used for self-interested reasons, rather than being 
included for ‘doing good’.  So, even though the EU claims that the TSD chapter is included 
for a positive reason, it might not always be perceived like that. According to the EU, the aim 
of including the TSD chapter is ‘to maximize the potential of increased trade and investment 
to decent work and environmental protection, including the fight against climate change and 
engage with partner countries in cooperative process fostering transparency and civil society 
involvement’ (IBID).  
According to Zurek (2018: 123), early references of clauses in regards to sustainable 
development in the EU’s FTAs go back to the beginning of the 1990s, even though the 
phenomenon is relatively new. At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU started to include 
clauses of human rights in its FTAs, but the inclusion of material provisions was not included 
in the agreements until much later. By adding a TSD chapter in the FTAs, the contracting 
parties can use the FTA as a control measure to strengthen the commitments to sustainable 
development and at the same time promote dialogue and cooperation. The inclusion of a TSD 
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chapter sends the signal that issues of sustainable development are to regard it as equal to 
economic issues (Zurek 2018: 124). However, economic matters and sustainable issues are 
not treated similar in an FTA, since no standard dispute settlement mechanism is included in 
the TSD chapter, which means that no party can be sanctioned for not following the chapter. 
However, the content in the TSD chapters is built upon provisions to already existing rights 
and obligations, mostly from the ILO conventions and MEAs, which the trade partners 
(usually) already have committed themselves to. Therefore, the TSD chapters are not creating 
any no obligations or commitments for the trade partners, instead it is about promoting 
cooperation between the parties in implementing their already existing commitments (Zurek 
2018: 125).  
Cecilia Malmström says in a speech from the 2nd of May 2016 that the European and 
universal core values drive the Trade for All strategy, and that it makes clear that the EU’s 
trade policy goes beyond economic interests (Malmström 2016: 3).  This goes hand in hand 
with the notion that Alvstam and Lindberg (2018: 99) brings up that since supply and value 
chains have been more and more integrated into our globalised society, it is essential to see 
the social policies as part of the trade policies. Trade politics should not be seen as isolated 
phenomena; instead, it should be an integrated component in the effects of globalisation. In a 
speech from the 24th of January 2017, Malmström argues that ‘we can shape globalisation 
rather than merely submitting to it, or letting others shape it for us’ (Malmström 2017: 4). 
Promoting the EU’s standards abroad can do this, and trade policy can, therefore, be seen as a 
vehicle for the European values. Another point that was brought up in the speech was that 
since the EU is the largest market in the world, it has a lot to offer to its trade partners, but it 
also expects things in return from its partners in negotiations. The partners are therefore 
expected to comply with the TSD chapter and agree to it; otherwise, a trade deal cannot be 
done with the EU.  
In a speech from March 2018, Malmström states ‘trade has never been just about goods – it is 
about values too’ (Malmström 2018: 1). It, therefore, seems like including sustainable 
development, as a value in FTAs, is a ‘natural thing’ for the EU to do. Values are passed on 
through commerce, among other things; therefore the EU includes values within its trade 
policy. In this speech, Malmtröm once again points out that it uses trade to shape 
globalisation and the world (Malmström 2018: 8). Malmström also claims that all of the EU’s 
recent agreements uphold EU standards and multilateral efforts. It, therefore, seems like the 
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EU includes the value of sustainable development as a norm in its FTAs because it wants to 
shape globalisation, instead of letting trade be a race-to-the-bottom regarding social policies, 
and because it see’s trade and sustainable development go hand in hand.  
A reason for why the TSD chapter can be seen as being part of the EU’s norm diffusion is 
because it is based on soft law and voluntary processes. However, the Union has started to 
question the effectiveness of the TSD chapter (European Commission 2017). In July 2017, the 
Commission presented a non-paper regarding the TSD chapters in EU FTAs, regarding a 
discussion/evaluation of the current outline of the TSD chapter. The question that arises is if 
the TSD chapter is implemented effectively enough and if changes should be made. A 
suggestion that was made in the paper was if the EU should sanction its trade partners if they 
do not fulfil the chapter. However, the conclusion was that such an approach does not fit into 
the EU model. The US uses such a model, for example, however the scope of the TSD 
chapter is then much broader. The EU states that ‘negotiating partner would not accept a 
broad scope combined with trade sanctions’ (European Commission 2018b). Instead, it will 
make use of the already existing mechanism and strengthen to ensure compliance with the 
TSD chapter, as well as encouraging early ratification of the core international agreements 
within the chapter to partner countries.  
It seems to be that the EU includes the value of sustainable development because it wants to 
shape globalisation and ensure that social policies are an integrated part of trade agreements. 
The norm seems to be a part the EU’s identity and strategy in international relations, which 
makes it look like the EU has a shared commitment for this value. Since the TSD chapter is 
built upon incentives rather than sanctions, it makes it possible for norm diffusion to occur on 
a cooperative basis rather than a coercive basis. However, the nature of trade negotiations 
matter and the next section will outline how the EU diffuses sustainable development in its 
FTAs.  
5.2 How the EU Pursues its Norm Diffusion of Sustainable Development in FTAs 
The EU pursues its norm diffusion of sustainable development in its FTAs, mainly by 
including the TSD chapter. This chapter has so far only been included in bilateral trade 
agreements. Therefore, trade liberalization and sustainable development promotion go hand in 
hand for the EU. However, it was not until 2006 and the Global Europe strategy that the 
European Commission started to see bilateral trade agreements as an option to trade 
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liberalization. Before, its stated premise was that it would have a multilateral approach within 
the framework of World Trade Organization (WTO) as the only strategy to trade liberalisation 
(Langhorst 2007: 2). However, the EC sees this bilateral approach as complementary to 
multilateralism. Multilateral agreements are concluded between three or more nations, and 
these typically follow the rules of the WTO (Britannica 2018a). Bilateral agreements are 
conducted between two parties, and the parties themselves agree to the rules of the 
negotiation (Britannica 2018b).  
The reason to why the EU opened up for bilateral agreements is that they will give better 
access to current and new markets for the European producers, investors and service 
providers, which will increase the competitiveness of the European market (Wróbel 2013: 
16). The bilateral agreements can also be seen as a promotion of multilateralism according to 
the EC since it is possible to tackle issues that go beyond the WTO agenda, such as 
sustainable development (Langhorst 2007: 5). The Global Europe strategy meant a shift in the 
bilateral strategy so it would pursue the economic interests of the EU; previously these were 
sought in multilateral agreements (Peterson and Young 2014: 186). There is no clear answer 
in the literature if the bilateral agreements that the EU negotiates are a complement or a 
substitute for multilateralism, it could also be a way for the EU to have more negotiation 
power (Garcia-Duran 2016: 29).  
The literature suggests that if negotiations are taken place outside the framework of the WTO, 
it can weaken the basic set of rules in trade. If bilateral trade agreements undermine the 
multilateral system, countries can become more reluctant to enter into multilateral 
negotiations. This would make less economically powerful nations disadvantaged, in the way 
that powerful economies might only conclude agreements with their most important trading 
partners. The EU pursues its norm diffusion through bilateralism, and not multilateralism, 
which can affect what kind of an actor it is. The next section will explain why the TSD was 
not included in the ASEAN negotiations and why they failed, but why it was successfully 
integrated into the bilateral agreements with Singapore and Vietnam 
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5.3 Failed Negotiations with ASEAN and Successful Negotiations with 
Singapore/Vietnam 
5.3.1 Failed Negotiations with ASEAN 
The establishment of ASEAN occurred in 1967 by Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. Since then, five additional states have joined the regional 
organisation: Brunei Darassalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar (1997), Laos (1997) and 
the newest member that was admitted in 1999 was Cambodia (ASEAN 2018). ASEAN is the 
largest coherent regional trading block in Asia and has around 640 million inhabitants 
(Alvstam and Lindberg 2018: 108). The ASEAN block is of importance for EU since it is 
ranked third among the major trading partners of the EU outside of Europe (Hoang  2017: 
532). The EU is ASEAN’s second largest trading partner, after China and is the largest 
investor in the region (European External Action Service 2018).  However, the trade and 
economic relations between the two regions are asymmetrical; the EU is much more of an 
important trading partner for ASEAN than what ASEAN is for the EU (Doan 2012).  
A reason for why the EU started to negotiate with ASEAN as a region first, and not with the 
bilateral is that the EU has a desire to promote regional integration in other parts of the world. 
It is one of the EU’s policies to promote region-to-region agreement, in which it links an FTA 
to encourage regional integration in partner regions. According to Woolcock (2007), the EU 
prefers regional integration because it sees it as a means of promoting economic and political 
stability that follows the European experience.  
In line with the Global Europe strategy that the EU presented, negotiations with an 
interregional trade agreement with ASEAN started the year 2007. The negotiations were 
paused in 2009, and one of the reasons to it was because of different levels of ambition for the 
FTA between the two regions. It has been suggested by Alvstam and Lindberg (2018) that 
even though it as a noble ambition of the EU to include a TSD chapter in FTAs, it makes it 
harder to conclude an agreement since more areas need to be negotiated and sometimes 
partner countries lacks experience or off-sets the idea to negotiation a TSD chapter.  Including 
a TSD chapter in the talks with ASEAN was in sharp contrast to the Chinese FTA approach 
(Hoang 2017: 535).  ASEAN has 98 enforced FTAs in place, where only 6 of those contain 
labour as an area of negotiation in the agreement text (Basu Das et al. 2017: 12).  
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For ASEAN, its view is to stand by firmly against protectionist policies and resist new non-
tariff barriers to enhance growth and investment in the region. In other words, a TSD chapter 
is not part of its primary reference (Hoang 2017: 536). Most of the governments in ASEAN 
seem to believe that too much emphasis on social issues will threaten their economic growth, 
which is their goal. The attitude in ASEAN seems to be ‘grow now, clean up later’ (Hoang 
2017: 536). However, since the economy of some ASEAN countries has experienced rapid 
growth, the concerns for the environmental policies have increased. This suggests that more 
developed economies in ASEAN have it easier to agree to a TSD chapter, rather than 
countries with low economic development such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 
(Hoang 2017: 537).  
The opposition within ASEAN to link trade and labour policies stems from the view that no 
labour regulations will bring more trade and investment flows within ASEAN. Instead, the 
comparative advantage within ASEAN can be enhanced because of lower wage production 
but also increase the attractiveness of ASEAN as a destination for foreign investment in large-
scale, in turn this will strengthen the ability to promote economic development, which will 
benefit the population at large and the labour force (Hoang 2017: 538).  
The reason for ASEAN to reject the TSD chapter seems to be economic related since the 
standards in the TSD chapter can be seen as too high for some member countries to fulfil in 
the way that it does not have enough know-how and modern facilities to comply and adapt to 
the standards. It could also be seen that the TSD chapter is seen as a barrier for exports for the 
ASEAN countries since they cannot export if they do not fulfil the environmental and labour 
standards. This could give the EU an advantage since it fulfils these standards. The EU, on the 
other hand, sees this more as prevention for anti-dumping, in the way that countries that 
produce cheaper commodities should not get an advantage by not fulfilling the labour and 
environmental standards (Hang et al. 2014).  
Two other key reasons to for the negotiations between the EU and ASEAN to be paused is 
political and economic related. In regards to the political reason, ASEAN wanted a region-to-
region agreement, which included all of its ten members. However, the EU wanted to exclude 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar since their levels of economic development did not justify 
their participation. Concerning the economic-related reason, there existed diversities in 
ASEAN countries that made a single deal extremely difficult. For ASEAN as a region, it was 
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not possible to go beyond a purely goods-FTA, while the EU wanted a broader agreement, 
which included issues such as climate change, labour standards, and intellectual property 
(Doan 2012). The difference in governing the two regions is seen as one of the reasons to why 
the negotiations failed between the two parties, with ASEAN lacking common negotiation 
machinery (Hoang 2017: 533). 
5.3.2 Successful Negotiations with Singapore 
After the failed talks with ASEAN, the EU initiated talks with the countries of ASEAN, an 
overview of these is found in section 5.2 under case selection. In the EU’s trade strategy from 
2015, it states that it should have the ambition to enter comprehensive bilateral trade 
agreements with important economic nations outside of the near geographical area (Cramér 
2018: 67). However, the negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam were initiated before this 
strategy was agreed upon, but the agreements can still be considered to be comprehensive. 
Singapore is the only country in ASEAN that has substantial experience in regards to 
integrating labour rights and environmental standards into trade agreements, and it is also the 
country that has made the most ambitious commitments concerning core labour standards at 
global level (Hoang 2017: 538). Singapore is also the country in ASEAN that has the largest 
number of FTAs (Khandekar 2014). Singapore has ratified six out of the eight fundamental 
ILO conventions, whereas Vietnam has ratified five (Hoang 2017: 537). Vietnam has also 
ratified or agreed upon to 11 MEAs, and in 2013 it gained a seat as an Asian represent to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, even though the decision was heavily criticized 
among Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), due to the Vietnamese human rights 
record (Sicurelli 2015: 28).  
Singapore’s economy is very innovative and is built upon high skilled people; it is also a 
regional (and strives to be a global) hub for activities within trade and finance. In regards to 
labour provisions, the country has relatively high standards, so in regards to agreeing to the 
TSD chapter, the nation should not have many objections. However, Singapore had internal 
debates regarding the TSD chapter, and there was a systematic objection of Singapore to the 
inclusion of a TSD chapter since it was seen as interfering with domestic policies in these 
matters (Garcia and Masselot 2015). It was more discussions if the TSD chapter was 
supposed to be a subject within the FTA rather than the content in it. As previously 
mentioned, Singapore has made ambitious commitments to labour provisions at a global 
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level, so the inclusion of a TSD chapter might not make that much of a difference concerning 
the implementation and ratification of the ILO conventions. However, the European 
Commission highlighted the importance of including the TSD chapter is not only important 
for Singapore, but it is crucial to serve as an example for future bilateral FTAs (Pollet-Fort 
2011: 30).  The EUSFTA is seen as the EU’s first “green” FTA since it contains specific 
terms on liberalisation of environmental services (Cuyvers et al. 2013: 14). 
5.3.3 Successful Negotiations with Vietnam 
The FTA between the EU and Vietnam also contains a TSD chapter, and according to 
Khandekar (2014), the EU has been essential in promoting sustainable development in 
Vietnam. As previously mentioned, the EU seeks in its strategy to negotiate with important 
economic nations, and Vietnam does not traditionally belong to these nations. In the press 
release that the European Commission issued when the agreement had been reached with 
Vietnam, Cecilia Malmström said: ‘this agreement is the first of its kind that the EU has 
concluded with a developing country. As such, the ambitious and symmetrical liberalisation 
agreed upon – with a transition period to allow Vietnam to adapt – breaks new ground 
compared to other EU agreements with developing country’s’ (European Commission 
2015b). The FTA with Vietnam is therefore unique of its kind. Symmetrical in Malmström’s 
speech is regarding the trade liberalization and not the dialogue, which will be discussed in 
section 6.4.  
The size of the EU’s market and the attractiveness of it provide the EU with an important 
bargaining chip to promote its norms and values in trade negotiations. For Vietnam, the EU is 
the most important export market for Vietnamese products and the second largest trade 
partner after China. The negotiation of a bilateral FTA with the EU was therefore of great 
importance for Vietnam (Sicurelli 2015: 24). Since Vietnam is a developing economy, it has 
been suggested that it has a harder time accepting a TSD chapter since it might not have the 
economic muscles to ratify the core agreements within. However, it could also be seen as 
accepting these conditions easier, because it is so dependent on trade with the EU.  
Vietnam has not included labour provisions in an FTA before; however, the TPP would have 
contained such policies, but in much narrower scope (Hang et al. 2014:4).  Vietnam is 
dependent on the type of agreements that their competitors sign because it needs to maintain 
its competitiveness against them. Since the EU started its trade negotiations with Singapore, 
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Malaysia, and Thailand, it was important for Vietnam to join the negotiations as well to gain 
market access (Hang et al. 2014: 5). There were also geopolitical reasons for Vietnam to 
conduct an FTA with the EU since it wanted to maintain its trade liberalisation and domestic 
reforms, to strengthen its bargaining power in international trade (IBID). For Vietnam, 
economic interests have priority over social interests, such as labour and environmental issues 
(Hang et al. 2014: 8). It has been suggested in the literature that if Vietnam’s trade partners do 
not request to include labour issues in the agreements, Vietnam does not bring it up on its 
own (Hang et al. 2014: 10). An example of this is that none of the Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) that the ASEAN is a part of contains any labour provisions.  
According to Sicurelli (2015: 25) the TSD chapter and the promotion of sustainable 
development as a norm, gained support from the Vietnamese elites because it was seen as 
functional to integrate Vietnam into the global market and international organizations. 
However, just as with Singapore, the Vietnamese elites criticized the EU for interfering in 
domestic policies. The EU was also criticized for engaging in politically sensitive issues in 
the country, such as human rights. The private actors in Vietnam saw the environmental 
regulations in the FTA with the EU as positive, which could make its productions and exports 
more competitive. The government and NGOs were more sceptical however and were afraid 
of green protectionism in the sense that the EU would want to intrude the Vietnamese 
constitutional laws in regards of environmental and labour protection (Hoang 2016). Strong 
opposition was raised in regard to the EU’s position on the ILO core labour standard of 
freedom of association for workers (Sicurelli 2015: 33). Vietnam also feared to lose 
competitiveness because of the TSD chapter, since it base its competitiveness on cheap, low-
skilled labour and short-term, labour commitments can raise compliance cost, which could 
reduce the country’s competitiveness of domestic workers, compared with foreign workers. 
However, it recognized that long-term benefits might be created if its labour force is highly 
skilled and the country would have a higher position in the global labour divisions and value 
chains (Hang et al. 2014: 10).  
Despite these concerns, the TSD chapter was still included in the FTA with Vietnam. This 
must mean that the economic interests trumped its objections, and since Vietnam does not 
seem to prioritize sustainable development over economic interest, it cannot be seen that 
sustainable development is part of the country values. Sustainable development cannot be 
seen as part of values of Singapore either, but the TSD chapter was not such a controversy in 
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the country, it was mostly regarding the fact if the EU should be allowed to decide over 
domestic policies or not. The fact that the TSD chapter was not part of a dispute settlement 
mechanism made it easier for the countries to agree to it since they do not want to be 
sanctioned for not complying. It was easier for the EU to include this chapter bilaterally than 
multilaterally, a part of this is because its bargaining tools are much more prominent in 
bilateral trade negotiations. 
5.3.4 Future Negotiations with ASEAN? 
According to the EU, the long-term ambition is to re-start the negotiations with ASEAN. 
Small steps have been taken for it to happen. In Manila, August 2017 an action plan between 
the Union and ASEAN for 2018 to 2022 was agreed upon, but no trade negotiations have 
been initiated again, however to two parties have started to think about the requirements that 
are necessary for the talks to resume (Cameron 2017). Sustainable development is a part of 
the action plan and points on how to strengthen it (European External Action Service 2017).  
Since many of ASEAN countries are still developing, it is likely that it will prioritize 
economic growth over social objectives in the trade policies, however, if the EU will not 
conclude an agreement with ASEAN unless a TSD chapter is included, it will most likely 
come down to how much ASEAN is dependent on an FTA with the EU, if it agrees to it or 
not. With Trump becoming a president of the United States and changing the strategy to 
“America First”, the US paused negotiations with TPP. The Trump administration foreign 
policy stance is a clear priority of negotiating trade deals bilaterally rather than multilaterally, 
and even before regionalism (Cramér 2018: 69). This will make it likely that ASEAN wants 
to pursue its talks with the EU, and it will allow for the EU to dictate the trade terms with 
ASEAN. However, if the TSD chapter then gets included, an important question arises: does 
the EU diffuse its norm or does it give its trading partners no other choice than accepting it? 
5.4 Actor Analysis of the EU 
The actor analysis will be carried out using the four different categories that were created in 
4.4. These categories are Interests, Behaviour, Means of Power and Desired Outcome. The 
EU is analysed as an actor in the setting of itspromotion of sustainable development in its 
FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam. 
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5.4.1 Interests 
A normative actor has normative interests according to the normative power actor theory, and 
an example of this is the inclusion of social dimensions in its trade policies, whereas the self-
interested actor theory suggests that the actor have interests that benefit itself, rather than the 
‘common good’. The first and second criteria for actorness is regarding having a set of 
overarching shared values and principles and the ability to identify coherent policies, and 
these policies and values stem from the EU’s interests. 
The EU has a normative commitment to sustainable development, but as Burchell and 
Lightfoot (2005: 91) points out, it also has ‘a strategic interest in ensuring that the model of 
sustainable development adopted is one that does not damage the Union’s economic 
competitiveness’. Orbie (2011) claim that the fact that the EU promotes labour standards is in 
line with the normative power theory, however, if the EU would use it arbitrarily and 
selectively, it would jeopardize the quality of the EU as a normative power. ‘It is unclear how 
it would deal with the tension between market-making policies (economic freedom) and 
interventionist or redistributive policies (aiming at social solidarity, equality, and sustainable 
development)’ (Orbie 2011: 164-165).  Usually, the market-making policies have a priority 
over the interventionist or redistributive policies (IBID).   
Looking at the ASEAN negotiations, the fact that the EU did not agree with ASEAN since it 
was not possible to include a TSD chapter could be seen as it prioritised its social policies 
over market-making policies. However, that would be an exaggeration, since the ASEAN 
agreement did not fail solely because of the TSD chapter, but the chapter represented the 
different ambition levels of the two regions, which made it difficult to agree. It is therefore 
not clear if the EU prioritised one interest over another, but it is clear that the TSD chapter is a 
new standard in the EU’s trade agreements, which could represent that it has normative 
interests. However, the TSD chapter is not treated in the same way as other trade policies, 
since they are non-binding and neither Singapore nor Vietnam can be sanctioned for not 
following the chapter. Although, the fact that the TSD chapter is designed on dialogue and 
positive conditionality makes it fit with the NPE theory (Orbie 2911: 176). As previously 
stated, some countries fear that the EU is using the TSD chapter as a hidden cloak for 
protectionist use, but since the EU cannot sanction nations for not following the chapter, it 
does not seem likely that the EU use it for that reason.  
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An interesting point that Smith and Youngs (2018) raises is that in the EU’s trade strategy, it 
wants to be seen as conducting ‘fair’ and balanced trade, but at the same time it is defending 
the European commercial interests. Sicurelli (2015: 25) findings from how the elites in 
Vietnam perceives the EU, shows that even though the EU has the ambition to be perceived 
as an international leader and ‘an actor whose milieu goals are shared by others, the EU is 
often viewed as a mere economic leader’.  
It is important to keep in mind that sustainable development is not the only norm that the EU 
is committed too; multilateralism is another one of its norms. Therefore, it could be seen as a 
tension between the EU’s two norms when it promotes sustainable development, but it does 
so bilaterally and not multilaterally. Smith and Youngs (2018: 46) state that one reason of the 
clash is ‘the Union’s commitment to multilateral rules and order, on the one hand, and its own 
needs as an economic and political system, on the other hand’.  
In a speech by Cecilia Malmström (2016), she says that ‘for us, multilateralism is not just a 
way of cooperating with many partners. For the EU, multilateralism is about using the rule of 
law to limit the strong and protect the smaller actors’. This statement seems to be rather 
contradictive, because in what way is the EU limiting itself as a strong actor and protecting 
smaller actors when it is conducting bilateral agreements with nations like Singapore and 
Vietnam? Malmström emphasises in the same speech that in the Trade for All strategy, the 
multilateral trading system remains at the core in the EU’s trade strategy and that multilateral 
solutions are the first best option and if it does not work, then other solutions can be looked 
at. The EU did start negotiating with ASEAN, and it was not until the pause of the 
negotiations that it began to negotiate bilaterally with the members of ASEAN. This could be 
seen as the EU still considered the value of multilateralism. Another point that speaks for the 
EU still taking multilateralism into consideration even though it conducts FTAs bilaterally is 
that the TSD chapter have a multilateral approach in the sense that the parties have to agree to 
international recognised conventions and agreements (Vogler 2005: 838).  
Manners (2002) claim that the norms that the EU wants to diffuse can be seen as universal, 
whereas Aggestam (2008: 6) suggest that the norms/values that are proposed as universal are 
‘in some parts of the world seen as little more than an imposition of western values’. It could, 
therefore, be seen, as these ‘universal’ values that the EU wants to spread, could be values 
that the EU seeks to spread for its own agenda. Some would even argue that the norms that 
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the EU promotes are neoliberal (Orbie 2011; Bailey and Bossuyt 2013). However, Diez 
(2005) points out that the problem is not that a normative power has strategic interests, the 
problem is that strategic interests cannot be distinguished easily. Khorana and Orbie (2015: 
261) argue that in the case of the core labour standards of the ILO that are being promoted, 
they can be seen as universal norms. Even though some might see it as the social clauses are 
used for protectionist interests. Manners (2002) explain that the EU does not seek to diffuse 
its norms for a self-interested reason since it is more costly than profitably to spread norms 
(Manners 2002: 33).  
It seems like the EU wants to ensure a  ‘level playing field’ in the international community 
regarding labour and environmental standards to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, which could 
speak for normative interests. Since the base the TSD chapter on a cooperative and soft-law 
approach, it speaks for the notion that its sustainable development is part of its normative 
interests and that is how it was outlined in the agreements with Singapore and Vietnam, but 
that does not mean that it behaves as a normative actor.  
5.4.2 Behaviour 
The normative power theory suggests that a normative power behaves in a normative way, 
which means that it acts appropriately and behaving to international norms.  A self-interested 
actor does not necessarily need to do this since it acts in the way that benefits it the most. In 
regards to the actorness criteria, the behaviour of the EU corresponds to its ability to negotiate 
with other actors in the international system effectively.  
In a trade negotiation, the EU could be seen as spreading norms when acting as a role model, 
and this usually happens in bilateral or regional multilateral talks. Some norms are required 
elements in the EU’s trade agreements, and therefore third (often weaker) parties have to 
accept these norms; otherwise, there will be no agreement. However, for other negotiations, 
the process of the talk is usually where the EU seeks to promote its norms.  Therefore, the 
nature of the negotiation process matters to determine the success of norm diffusion. In a 
trade negotiation with open communication, where actors meet frequently and listen to each 
other, the chance for norm transfer is quite high, but it could go both ways. In situations with 
tough bargaining, where the norm sender uses threats or manipulation, the acceptance of the 
norms form the receiver may increase, but the chance of norm internalization becomes 
doubtful. In asymmetrical trade negotiations, the norm sender could use coercive means to 
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push the process forward and ensuring the compliance (Björkdahl and Elgström 2015: 137-
138).  
In the negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam, it can be discussed if the EU spreads the 
norm of sustainable development by acting as a role model or not. However, it is clear that 
both Singapore and Vietnam had to accept the norm of sustainable development in the TSD 
chapter for the agreement to be conducted. The appropriateness of this is questionable since 
the weaker third parties cannot set against the inclusion of these norms in the agreement. 
Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 539) argue that the EU follows international standards, and it is 
using soft power rather than hard power, but it uses soft power in a hard way. This is because 
it is using an asymmetric form of dialogue and it imposes a strategic use of norms, rather than 
creating a genuine dialogue.  
The norms that the EU spreads do not need to be strategic norms; it is possible that the EU 
has normative interests. However, these interests do not correspond with the norms of 
Singapore and Vietnam, especially not the latter country. Even though the dialogue was built 
upon cooperation, it was still built upon an asymmetric form. Although, the talks will mostly 
be asymmetric when the EU is conducting bilateral trade agreements. A normative power 
should consider multilateralism, while some claim that the EU still does that, it is evident that 
the EU started bilateral negotiations for its commercial interests. If the EU is determined to 
promote sustainable development and will not conclude an agreement if the TSD chapter is 
not included, how much of genuine dialogue is then created between the EU and its partner 
country if sustainable development is not part of the values of the states? The EU acts 
according to international standards, but its behaviour seems to relate more to a self-interested 
actor rather than a normative actor.  
5.4.4 Means of Power 
According to the NPE theory, the EU would use normative power rather than military or 
economic power. However, it does not rule out any other use of power, instead of that the EU 
should have a cooperative approach foremost and act according to the general rules and 
practices. A self-interested actor can use both soft and hard power tools, and Hettne and 
Söderbaum (2005: 539) suggest that the EU is using soft power but in a hard way.  
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Tocci (2008: 5) means that normative foreign policy is associated with the ideas of civilian 
power, which means that the foreign policy uses instruments such as economic, social, 
diplomatic and cultural instead of military ones. In regards to the sustainable development 
promotion, the EU has not used military power; instead, instruments such as diplomatic and 
economic have been used in the negotiations. A self-interested actor uses these instruments as 
well, but it does it more strategically. How is it then possible to distinguish what kind of an 
actor the EU is based on its policy instruments? 
According to Hoang and Sicurelli (2017: 374) the coercive economic instruments that the EU 
as to its disposal to promote norms through trade negotiations are: ‘threats or use of sanctions, 
embargos, increasing tariff and quotas and the inclusion of legally enforceable obligations in 
trade agreements’. However, this is not true in the case of promoting sustainable 
development. Although, the appropriateness could be questioned, which is important for a 
normative power when negotiating bilaterally since there are asymmetrical power relations, 
which could be seen as hard instruments (Hoang and Sicurelli 2017).  
Since both of the theories can use the same means of power, perhaps it is not which 
instruments that are used that is interesting, instead of how they are used (Tocci 2008: 5). As 
mentioned in the previous section, when the EU is negotiating with Singapore and Vietnam it 
is creating an asymmetric form of dialogue rather than a genuine dialogue. It could, therefore, 
be seen as the EU is using ‘carrot and sticks’ in order to diffuse its norms, since it will not 
conclude an agreement if the TSD chapter is not included. This makes it plausible to believe 
that the EU is using soft power in a hard way, which makes it more of a strategic actor than a 
normative actor.  
5.4.5 Desired Outcome 
The desired outcome for a normative power is to diffuse norms in the international system. 
Being successful in doing that is to make the norms ‘normal’ and to make the receiver of the 
norms internalize them. For a self-interested actor, the desired outcome is to pursue its 
strategic interests; this can be done by establishing a stable and cooperative environment.  
For an actor to have an effective normative foreign policy, it needs to not only pursue 
normative goals through normative means, but it also needs to achieve evident normative 
impacts, and the effect must be intended (Tocci 2008: 7). Orbie (2011: 180) argues that for 
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the EU to be seen as a normative power, it would have to manage to present the TSD chapter 
in the FTAs as something ‘normal’ in international relations, ‘without provoking fears of 
hidden protectionism’. As seen with Singapore and Vietnam, there are still suspicions if the 
TSD chapter is a cloak for a hidden agenda; however, the fact that it is based on soft-law and 
not hard-law makes it easier for the countries to comply with the chapter. Since the EU has 
the TSD chapter as a new standard in its FTAs, it makes it plausible to think that it is 
persistent in making the sustainable development promotion as something ‘normal’ in the 
international community.  
However, norm promotion is not just about negotiation parties accepting the norms; it is about 
making the countries internalize them as well. If the nations would ratify and implement the 
agreements, the EU might be seen as succeeding in its norm promotion. In regards to that, it is 
questionable how much a TSD chapter can do to affect countries behaviour. Since there are 
no consequences for not following the chapter, there are no real incentives to comply with the 
chapter. Singapore has ratified the most important conventions and agreements within the 
chapter, whereas Vietnam has a long way to go. Would Vietnam start to change its domestic 
policies just because it signed an agreement with the EU saying that it should, and if it does 
not, nothing will happen? 
The effectiveness of the TSD chapter has been questioned as previously mentioned, and a 
reason for that is because the enforcement mechanisms are lacking in the current design of the 
TSD chapter. The Union will, however, strengthen the existing mechanisms, but they are still 
based on cooperation and dialogue rather than sanctions. It, therefore, seems to be a bit of a 
limbo for the EU; if it wants to be the normative power it has to outline the chapter in a soft 
way, however, that might make the norm diffusion harder for the countries to internalize 
them. That might make the EU normative, but it will not make it a power actor. However, if 
the chapter would be based on the US approach where the scope of the chapter is narrower 
and the parties are able to sanction each other, it does not necessarily mean that the countries 
would internalise the norms either. It would be hard to point out what domestic reforms a 
nation has done that is specifically traceable back to the compliance to the TSD chapter, even 
though it might have had an effect.  
It is hard to decide if Singapore and Vietnam have internalised the norms because of the TSD 
chapter, and the effects cannot be seen yet since the agreements have not been implemented in 
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the countries. Perhaps, what the EU can do to make sustainable development ‘normal’ in 
international relations is to be persistent in including the TSD chapter in its trade agreements. 
However, just because the EU does this, does not make sustainable development ‘normal’, it 
needs to have followers as well. Currently, the countries that are promoting sustainable 
development are mostly Western countries such the EU, the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, etc. 
and for sustainable development to be truly ‘normal’ in international relations, it needs to be a 
standard for non-Western countries as well. Otherwise, it is might be that the EU is trying to 
transfer its Western values into other countries, which does not fit into their own values.  
Perhaps, some evidence can be seen in the future of Vietnam, the FTA with the EU is the first 
agreement, which contains labour provisions. If Vietnam would continue to include this, on 
itsown request, then maybe it could be seen as the EU are truly spreading norms instead of 
pushing for its own interests. A future agreement with the ASEAN is most likely going to 
contain a TSD chapter, and since the ASEAN usually does not include labour provisions in its 
agreements, it could also be a sign of the EU spreading its norms if ASEAN would start to 
add these in other agreements. Just because a TSD chapter is included in an FTA does not say 
that the EU has succeeded in spreading its norms, it might just mean that the EU has 
succeeded in spreading its own interests. This speaks for the notion that the EU is more of a 
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6. Conclusions 
To conclude, it is possible that the EU includes the value of sustainable development because 
it wants to make it normal in international relations and trying try ‘shape’ globalisation to 
avoid a race-to-the-bottom in regards to social policies. Since trade is integrating into many 
more areas these days, it seems reasonable to link these areas into FTAs. However, making 
the trade agreements deeper and more comprehensible also makes them harder to conclude. 
That was the case of the negotiations between EU and ASEAN that paused because of the two 
regions had different ambitions level with the agreement. For the EU to still enter the ASEAN 
market and protecting its commercial interests, it started to negotiate with the members of 
ASEAN bilaterally instead, and it has concluded negotiations with Singapore and Vietnam. 
The FTAs between the EU and Singapore/Vietnam were comprehensive, and a TSD chapter 
was included in both of the agreements, despite the fact that sustainable development is not 
part of their values. Singapore had it easier to accept the TSD chapter than Vietnam, since it 
has the most experience of the ASEAN countries in integrating labour provisions in trade 
agreements, and has also ratified the most ILO conventions. Singapore also has a strong 
economy, whereas Vietnam being less developed in the economy and not experienced in 
integrating labour provisions in FTAs, faced more difficulties to accept the chapter. Vietnam 
feared that the EU used the TSD chapter as a hidden cloak for protectionist use, but since it 
was based on soft law it made it easier to comply with it. It also feared that the labour 
provisions would lead to a disadvantage in its competitiveness, however, gaining market 
access to the EU convinced Vietnam to comply.  
It remains to be seen if the TSD chapter will make any impact in the two countries, but the 
FTAs should be seen as a model for future FTAs with ASEAN members, and in the end 
perhaps a model for a future agreement between the EU and ASEAN. The TSD chapter is 
designed in a way, which fits to the normative power theory, however it might also make it 
less efficient in order for compliance. The fact that the EU negotiates bilaterally creates an 
asymmetrical dialogue, which implies that it is using soft power in a hard way.  It can, 
therefore, be concluded that the EU is more of s self-interested actor than a normative actor in 
the case of its promotion of sustainable development in the FTAs with Singapore and 
Vietnam.  
 
   
   49 
6.1 Returning to the Questions  
Going back to the questions, the results show that the EU is a self-interested actor, since its 
behaviour is what is important, rather than its interests. It is hard to distinguish normative 
interests from strategic interests, but since the EU is not promoting sustainable development 
in its FTAs for a protectionist reason or an economical reason, it speaks for the notion that it 
could be a normative interest. However, the fact that the EU promotes it bilaterally makes it 
neglect its norm of multilateralism. This speaks for a prioritisation of the EU’s commercial 
interests, which points to the EU having strategic interests as well. The EU might have 
normative interests when promoting sustainable development in its FTAs, but since they do it 
bilaterally, it makes it prioritise commercial interests over its norm of multilateralism. It is 
therefore not clear if the EU only has normative interests or only strategic interests, this thesis 
therefore concludes that it is possible that the EU has both.   
The fact that the EU negotiated with Singapore and Vietnam bilaterally, instead of 
multilaterally seems to be an important factor to why the TSD chapter could be included in 
those agreements. In the regional negotiations with ASEAN, the TSD chapter represented a 
more comprehensive agreement than what ASEAN wanted. ASEN rejected the TSD chapter 
for economic reasons, but also because it was not compatible with the nations’ sovereignty. 
Singapore and Vietnam also felt like the TSD chapter was an intrusion over the domestic 
policies, but since they are only representing themselves in the negotiations, they could still 
make the decision to agree to the chapter. In the negotiations, an asymmetric dialogue was 
formed, since the EU is much more powerful than the two nations. It was easier for Singapore 
to agree to the TSD chapter since it has the most experience of ratifying the content of the 
TSD chapter. For Vietnam, market access to the EU and being competitive were two 
important reasons to why the agreed to the TSD chapter since the EU would not conclude the 
agreement if the chapter was not included.  
In regards to what kind of an actor the EU it is possible to see qualities of it in both of the two 
ideal types. Table 3 marks in italics, which of the categories that are a conceptualization of 
the two theories, that is most accurate of each variable, when applied to the results. The 
results are in favour for the self-interested conceptualization of the EU as an actor. The EU 
might have normative interests in regards to its sustainable development promotion, and it 
acts according to international standards, which speaks for it as a normative actor. However, 
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since the Union negotiates bilateral, asymmetric dialogues arise, which could be seen as using 
soft power in a hard way. This corresponds to the self-interested theory, since the EU is 
prioritising its commercial interests by negotiating bilateral, ultimately it benefits itself, rather 
than the ‘common good’. As can be seen from the table, at least two of the categories from the 
self-interested actor theory are fulfilled in the ideal type analysis. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis is confirmed in that the EU is a self-interested actor because it is exporting values 
and shaping the international system, ultimately to benefit its own interests. This relates to the 
general conceptions in the literature, and maybe should the normative power theory be seen as 
an ideal type of what the EU could be, instead of what it is.  
Table 3. Applying the variables to the results  
 Normative Power Actor Self-Interested Actor 
Interests Normative Interests Strategic interests 
Behaviour Behaves According to Norms Behaves According to Self 
Interests 
Means of Power Mostly Normative Power Civilian/Economic/Military 
Power 
Desired Outcome Achieve Normative Ends Achieve Self-Interested Ends 
 
6.2 Concluding Discussion 
This thesis supports the view that has been previously presented by scholars that the EU is a 
self-interested actor rather than a normative actor. The EU’s promotion of sustainable 
development might be based on normative interests, but it clashes with its promotion of 
multilateralism. As previously mentioned, the EU’s trade policies are suitable to analyse since 
it might show what interests were attached to the agreement and can give an indication if the 
EU prioritises its normative interests over its economic interests. While this can be true, this is 
not the case in the EU’s agreement with Singapore and Vietnam since it is the form of the 
negotiation that matters. The TSD chapter is included, which could indicate that the EU 
prioritizes its normative interests in regards to sustainable development. However, the fact 
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that the EU negotiates bilaterally is more telling that the EU prioritises its commercial 
interests. The EU has made it clear that the TSD chapter is part of its standards in its new 
FTAs and it does not seem likely that the EU would not include this chapter in the future. 
This supports the notion that the EU is more of a trade power or is using soft imperialism 
when negotiating trade agreements.  
The results of this paper have contributed to the current (extensive) debate regarding what 
kind of an actor the EU is in international relations. It proves that the trade area is a good area 
to study the actorness of the EU in since it can indicate what interests that the EU prioritises. 
The results can be generalizable, if similar cases are being studied. With that means if the EU 
negotiates bilaterally with countries that are less economically developed than itself, it can be 
assumed that the EU is a self-interested actor rather than a normative actor. However, if the 
EU negotiates on a regional or multilateral level, the results can differ. Mainly since the EU 
most likely will act accordingly to appropriateness then, but also consider its value of 
multilateralism. If another policy area of the EU is being researched, it is not certain that the 
EU is a self-interested actor. However, the fact that the EU is being considered as a self-
interested actor goes in line with the findings of existing literature. When Manners introduced 
the concept of NPE, he showed in the case of the EU’s human rights promotion, the EU could 
be considered a normative actor. Since then, scholars have researched different areas to see 
what kind of an actor the EU is. This paper contributes to that literature and shows that in the 
case of the EU’s sustainable development promotion in the bilateral agreements, it should be 
seen as a self-interested actor.  
The policy implications that the EU can draw from this is to reconsider their bilateral 
approach if it wants to be considered a normative actor. The EU views itself as a normative 
actor, but clearly this is not true in all cases. If the EU continues with bilateral agreements, it 
should consider a way to make the dialogue with the partner countries symmetrical.   
Future research should focus on the outcomes of the negotiations with Singapore and 
Vietnam. Since the agreements have not been implemented yet, it remains unclear if the EU 
has diffused sustainable development as a norm; however, it is trying to make it normal in 
international relations but the success of that also remains to be seen. Since the EU has 
questioned the effectiveness of the TSD chapter, it would also be suitable to study the effects 
of it, to contribute to the debate if chapters containing environmental and labour provision 
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should be based on hard or soft law. A TSD chapter based on hard law does not fit into the 
normative power theory; however, it would most likely make it more effective. This could 
lead to the question if the EU cares more about its image than its results.  
The EU claims to care about the multilateral society, and it tries to oppose itself from the 
Trump-administration by saying that it stands for something different, but the fact that the EU 
puts its commercial interests before its multilateral, might not make it so different after all. Its 
sustainable development promotion might make the EU look normative, but conducting the 
agreements bilaterally shows something different. The US has also included TSD chapter in 
their FTAs, and it remains to be seen if Trump will continue doing this or not in the future 
FTAs. If the US will do this out of normative interests of strategic interests is also unclear and 
is up to future researchers to decide. However, when it comes to the EU, it is possible that it is 
putting ‘EU First’, which might not make it so different compared to other international 
actors. This does not mean that the EU should be considered to be the same actor as the US; 
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